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Abstract: 
This paper tests the notion that private firms are more tax aggressive than public firms. 
Tax avoidance measures, e.g. effective tax rates, cannot be used to compare private 
and public firms when private and public firms have different levels of importance on 
financial accounting earnings (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). To disentangle financial 
reporting incentives from tax aggressiveness, I use the fact that European groups must 
prepare two sets of financial statements: first, group statements (consolidated), which 
provide information to investors, and, second, individual statements (unconsolidated), 
which are used for legal purposes, but not to inform investors. Since in individual 
statements financial reporting incentives do not vary between public and private firms, 
I use these effective tax rates to compare private and public firms. My findings show 
that public, not private, firms are more tax aggressive, as the effective tax rates of 
public firms are lower in individual and group statements. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The common notion in financial and tax accounting is that financial reporting of private 
firms is more likely to be influenced by taxation, and thus private firms are more (likely to be) 
tax aggressive (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 2010; Kosi and 
Valentincic 2012; Lin, Mills, and Zhang 2014). In line with this notion, prior literature shows 
that public firms have higher financial non-tax reporting costs that result in larger book-tax 
differences (Cloyd, Pratt, and Stock 1996; Mills and Newberry 2001). However, one cannot infer 
from these results that private firms are more tax aggressive, as book-tax differences cannot be 
used to compare firms with varying levels of importance on financial accounting earnings 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Larger book-tax differences could be the result of inflated 
financial accounting earnings or the result of tax aggressiveness. Thus, prior literature does not 
distinguish between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting incentives. If, for example, 
private firms are more tax aggressive but public firms inflate earnings, both types of firms appear 
to have the same effective tax rate. Summing up, prior literature does not show whether private 
firms are indeed more tax aggressive. Therefore, this paper empirically investigates whether 
private or public firms are more tax aggressive.1 
There are various reasons to observe different levels of tax aggressiveness between 
private firms and public firms due to varying costs and benefits for the involved parties. Public 
firms could face higher costs associated with aggressive tax strategies, as they usually have a 
higher level of mandatory disclosure than private firms. This could lead to less tax 
aggressiveness, as more information increases the ability of tax authorities to detect aggressive 
                                                          
1 Conceptually, I define tax aggressiveness or tax avoidance as any attempt to decrease tax obligations. This includes 
legal actions and actions that fall into a grey area. This definition is similarly used in prior literature (e.g. Dyreng, 
Hanlon, and Maydew 2008). 
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tax strategies (Hope, Ma, and Thomas 2013; Jacob, Rohlfing-Bastian, and Sandner 2014). Thus, 
public firms might be less tax aggressive than private firms. However, public firms may also 
have higher benefits associated with tax aggressiveness when earnings targets are based on after-
tax earnings. Managers might be inclined to reach these earnings targets by using aggressive tax 
strategies (Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004). Ultimately, it is an empirical question as to 
whether listing status shapes tax aggressiveness. To tackle this question, I exploit the fact that 
European groups must provide two different sets of financial reports, namely (1) individual (i.e. 
separate or unconsolidated) statements and (2) group (consolidated) statements. 
In many European countries, individual statements are the starting point to determine the 
tax obligation, and the same tax rules apply for private and public firms. Calculating the effective 
tax rates based on individual statements overcomes the problem of varying levels of financial 
reporting incentives between public and private firms, as there is no evidence that investors use 
individual statements. Instead, there are multiple forms of evidence that investors do not use 
individual statements: (i) individual statements are not covered in earnings calls, (ii) they often 
cannot be found online in investor relations sections, (iii) there are no analyst forecasts based on 
individual statements, (iv) key indicators such as earnings per share (EPS) are based on 
consolidated after-tax earnings and (v) even if all individual statements of a group were 
available, combining them is not only very costly, but meaningless for investors without taking 
intercompany transactions into account.2 Thus, I can observe effective tax rates for public and 
private firms, absent capital market pressure and earnings management incentives that would 
affect the denominator (pre-tax income) differently for public and private firms. 
                                                          
2 Although I could not find any evidence that some investors use individual statements, I cannot entirely rule out this 
possibility. Nevertheless, capital market incentives are at least reduced to a large extent. 
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The sole purpose of group statements is to provide information, and there is no book-tax 
alignment. As public and private firms have different financial reporting incentives, investigating 
only group statements would not allow for conclusions about the difference in tax aggressiveness 
of public and private firms. 
The analyses use two sets of data. I start with a detailed German sample, and then verify 
that the German results are generalizable in a broader European context. Starting with Germany 
is especially useful, as a unique feature of the German setting is that the effective tax rate of the 
individual statement of the parent captures not only the effective tax rate of the parent, but the 
effective tax rate of the full tax group.3 In both samples, Germany and Europe, I compute two 
different effective tax rates for each company based on the individual statements of the parents 
and group statements. 
The findings of this paper show that German (European) public firms are more tax 
aggressive than private firms, and the magnitude is highly significant.4 Conditional on 
controlling for other factors, public firms have, on average, an effective tax rate that is 4.4 (2.4) 
percentage points lower in their individual statements and an effective tax rate that is 4.6 (2.0) 
percentage points lower in their group statements. Neglecting the costs of tax aggressiveness, 
this reduction translates into a reduction of approximately 0.5 percentage point return on equity 
per year for an average firm. 
                                                          
3 Germany permits tax consolidation of domestic subsidiaries (Organschaft), and in order to benefit from this tax 
consolidation firms are required to transfer all pre-tax profits to the parent. The pooled profit in the individual 
statement of the parent is then used as a starting point to calculate the tax liability. Therefore, the individual 
statement of the parent captures the effective tax rate of the entire tax group. 
4 It is unlikely that firms’ tax aggressiveness influences the decision to go public. Thus, endogeneity is not a 
concern. However, the decision to go public is a choice made by management which could potentially introduce the 
problem of omitted correlated variables when the determinants to go public affect tax aggressiveness. Pagano, 
Panetta, and Zingales (1998) show that mainly the firms’ size and industry characteristics are related to the decision 
to go public. Thus, the models control for size and include industry fixed effects. Furthermore, I repeat all analyses 
with a propensity score matched subsample. The results remain qualitatively the same. Furthermore, I find that when 
firms carry out an IPO, the effective tax rate decreases consecutively. 
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The difference in effective tax rates of public versus private firms based on the group 
statements are in the same direction and similar magnitude as in individual statements. 
Furthermore, both effective tax rates are highly correlated (Pearson: 0.63). Thus, I conclude that 
the difference in effective tax rates between public and private firms exists not only domestically 
at the level of individual statements, but likely also for the whole group as indicated by group 
statements. 
I conduct additional tests to corroborate the results. When I limit the sample to firms that 
carried out an IPO during the sample period, the findings show that firms become more tax 
aggressive after the IPO. Furthermore, the results are not influenced by different levels of 
conforming tax avoidance or using long-run effective tax rates over a period of 10 years. 
This paper contributes to the literature by showing that the general notion that private 
firms are more tax aggressive seems to be premature. While prior literature found that private 
firms have higher book-tax differences (e.g. Cloyd et al. 1996; Mills and Newberry 2001) and 
are more likely to shift income across jurisdictions (Beuselinck, Deloof, and Vanstraelen 2015), 
the findings of this paper show that public firms, not private ones, are more tax aggressive. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides details on the 
institutional setting, while section III reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 
IV reports results for the German sample, and section V for the European sample. Section VI 
provides corroborating results, and section VII offers conclusions. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
This section provides detailed information on the institutional setting in Germany. 
Germany is especially useful when investigating the differences between private and public 
firms, as the tax rules are the same for both private and public firms. Furthermore, as described 
below in more detail, a unique feature of Germany is that the effective tax rate computed based 
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on the individual statement of the parent captures not only the effective tax rate of the parent’s 
income, but also the entire tax group in Germany (i.e. including the income of all domestic 
subsidiaries).  
Individual and group accounts in Germany 
Traditionally, Germany has a high book-tax alignment (Pfaff and Schröer 1996). 
Nevertheless, some researchers find that Germany has low book-tax conformity (e.g. Atwood, 
Drake, and Myers 2012; Tang 2014). This finding is not surprising, as those researchers mostly 
use group (consolidated) statements from commercial databases (e.g. Compustat, Worldscope). 
The only purpose of group statements is to provide information, for example to capital market 
participants. Thus, there is no direct link between group statements and tax payments – which is 
acknowledged by the above-mentioned researchers in their footnotes. 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the institutional differences between individual and group 
statements for private and public firms in Germany. Individual financial statements follow 
German accounting rules and must be prepared for the parent company and for every subsidiary 
of the group separately. The requirement to prepare individual statements is based on legal form, 
not listing status, and both public and private firms are required to prepare their individual 
financial statements in accordance with German GAAP. There are no differences between 
private and public firms. 
 The sole purpose of group statements is to provide information, and there is no book-tax 
alignment. Similar to individual statements, the requirement to prepare group statements is based 
on legal form. Nevertheless, the so-called IAS regulation (European Parliament 2002) has 
required publicly listed firms in EU regulated markets to prepare their consolidated financial 
statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) since 2005. 
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Private firms in Germany may choose between German GAAP and IFRS for their consolidated 
financial statements. 
Effective tax rates of individual and group accounts 
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the differences between the effective tax rates of 
individual statements and group statements for private and public firms. Like other European 
countries, Germany uses tax consolidation of the parent company and controlled domestic 
subsidiaries (Organschaft). A special feature in the German context is that firms are allowed to 
consolidate their taxable income only when they also pool their profits in the individual financial 
statements. Therefore, German subsidiaries transfer their pre-tax profit directly to the parent 
where the profit is taxed. The parent company covers losses incurred by the subsidiaries 
accordingly. The individual statement of the parent company is then used as the starting point to 
determine the tax liability of the whole tax group. Thus, the effective tax rate of the parent’s 
individual statement captures the tax rate of the parent company and all domestic subsidiaries,5 
i.e. the full domestic operations of the group (Appendix A gives a simplified numerical example 
of how effective tax rates of individual and group statements are calculated).  
Similar to the institutional setting in Panel A, there are no differences between the 
effective tax rates of private firms and public firms. Thus, this setting allows me to compare the 
effective tax rates of public and private firms mainly for three reasons. First, both public and 
private firms must follow the same accounting rules (German GAAP). Second, there is no need 
                                                          
5 From a group perspective, it is tax beneficial to form a tax group where all German subsidiaries transfer their pre-
tax profit directly to the parent where the profit is taxed. Oestreicher and Koch (2010) show that firms entered into a 
tax group especially after the introduction of the territorial system in 2001. It is unlikely that German subsidiaries 
pay dividends (after tax) to the parent company, as the profit would partly be taxed twice – first, at the level of the 
subsidiary and second, 5% of the dividend income of the parent company would be taxed at the statutory tax rate. 
Thus, German firms should have transfers of profits and losses to the parent company, and all profits are taxed at the 
level of the parent company. 
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to estimate the extent to which the effective tax rate is influence by foreign income. Third, and 
more importantly, there is no evidence that capital market participants use individual statements. 
Thus, there are no differences in the importance of financial accounting earnings, and it is 
suitable to compare the effective tax rates of public and private firms. 
In contrast to individual statements, group statements are differently affected by financial 
reporting incentives between private and public firms (capital market incentives). The effective 
tax rate of group statements captures three different parts, namely the effective tax rate on 
domestic income, the effective tax rate on foreign income and financial reporting incentives. 
Insert Table 1 here 
III. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
To date, little research has been conducted in the context of private firms or as regards 
the differences between private and public firms. Among the first to study the differences 
between private and public firms were Penno and Simon (1986). Using a questionnaire, they find 
that publicly-traded firms are more likely to use income-increasing accounting methods. A 
similar finding is shown by Beatty and Harris (1998), who find that publicly listed banks engage 
in more earnings management than private banks. In contrast, Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006) 
find that private firms engage more in earnings management. This effect is increased in countries 
with stronger tax alignment for private firms, but not for public firms. Coppens and Peek (2005) 
find that in the absence of capital markets, European private firms avoid reporting small losses in 
countries with low book-tax alignment. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) find that earnings of UK 
private firms show less timely loss recognition than public firms. Similarly, Peek, Cuijpers, and 
Buijink (2010) show that shareholders of private firms demand less symmetric timeliness than 
shareholders of public firms. 
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Most studies related to taxation, study differences in book-tax differences between 
private and public firms. Cloyd et al. (1996) show that public firms have higher financial non-tax 
reporting costs that result in larger book-tax differences. Mills and Newberry (2001) confirm the 
survey results of Cloyd et al. (1996) with actual tax return data. Klassen (1997) uses inside 
ownership concentration as a proxy for reduced capital market pressure. His findings are 
consistent with the idea that managers of closely held firms are better able to signal their ability 
through direct communications, and thus have lower pressure to use income-increasing 
accounting choices. 
Prior literature that examined differences between public and private firms has looked 
into differences in income shifting. Lin et al. (2014) show that private firms shift income more 
from a high- to a low-tax year in response to a local tax rate change in China. Beuselinck et al. 
(2015) find that European multinationals shift income from high- to low-tax countries, and the 
effect is more pronounced for private firms. Although these findings indicate that private firms 
are more tax aggressive, income shifting is only one mechanism to reduce the tax burden. Tax 
strategies might be systematically different between private and public firms, as profit shifting 
currently receives much (negative) media attention, and public firms are more likely to be 
covered in the financial press. Thus, public firms potentially face higher costs associated with 
income shifting and, consequently, use alternative mechanisms (for example aggressive tax 
strategies within countries) to reduce their tax burdens. 
Chen et al. (2010) raise the question as to whether family firms are more tax aggressive 
than non-family firms. Their main finding is that family firms have higher effective tax rates and 
thus are considered less tax aggressive. Chen et al. (2010) attribute this finding to reputational 
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concerns of family owners. Furthermore, family owners are often under-diversified and are thus 
more vulnerable if tax enforcement actions take place. 
A recent working paper by Badertscher, Katz, Rego, and Wilson (2016) proposes a new 
measure of conforming tax avoidance and shows, among other validation tests, that public firms 
engage less in conforming tax avoidance strategies. However, as the authors acknowledge, their 
measure can potentially be biased when firms engage in decreasing earnings management (e.g. 
smoothing or earnings baths). This is especially problematic if earnings management incentives 
differ, for example between private and public firms. 
Generally, the decision to engage in aggressive tax strategies depends on the costs and 
benefits for the involved parties. Tax savings lead to rent extraction for shareholders and to 
higher salaries/bonuses for managers if they are incentivized accordingly. Whereas the benefits 
are obvious, the costs of tax avoidance can be direct or indirect. Direct costs are, for example, the 
costs of establishing complex tax structures within the group, as well as payments for tax 
advisors. Indirect costs are, for example, the increased likelihood of sanctions from the tax 
authorities and reputational costs. Thus, when managers trade off the costs and benefits, they 
have to incorporate multiple layers, and costs and benefits of tax aggressiveness could be 
different between public and private firms. 
Aggressive tax strategies could be more costly for public firms for several reasons. Public 
firms are required to disclose more information about, e.g. earnings, than private firms. This in 
turn helps the tax authority to detect aggressive tax strategies, and public firms would be less 
likely to engage in aggressive tax planning than private firms. Mandatory disclosure is used in a 
model by Jacob et al. (2014) that aims at providing a theoretical background to explain cross-
sectional differences in tax avoidance. The decision to engage in tax avoidance in a principal-
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agent setting depends on the costs and benefits associated with tax avoidance. Tax planning costs 
are increased for public firms due to the higher amount of disclosure. Their assumptions are in 
line with the results of Hope et al. (2013). The authors find that disclosure of regional earnings 
distribution is associated with lower worldwide effective tax rates. In particular, Hope et al. 
(2013) investigate the effects of the 1998 implementation of SFAS 131 which made geographic 
disclosures no longer mandatory. 
Furthermore, aggressive tax strategies increase book-tax differences. When investors are 
not able to distinguish whether high book-tax differences are the result of inflated earnings or tax 
strategies, large book-tax differences are considered a “red flag” to investors and enforcement 
agencies (Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 2004; Hanlon 2005). Overall, a higher level of 
disclosure and costs associated with high book-tax differences of public firms are potentially 
associated with less tax aggressiveness and thus higher effective tax rates. 
However, capital market participants could also incentivize managers of public firms to 
be more tax aggressive than private firms. It might be that capital market participants require 
public firms to engage in aggressive tax strategies, as competition on equity markets pressures 
managers to be more profitable. Bhojraj and Libby (2005) show that when managers are faced 
with high capital market pressure, managers behave more myopically when they report quarterly 
compared to semi-annually. Managers might be inclined to reach these earnings targets with 
aggressive tax strategies. Dhaliwal et al. (2004) find that firms decrease their effective tax rate in 
the fourth quarter in order to meet or beat the consensus analysts forecast. Thus, whether public 
firms or private firms are more tax aggressive is an open question, and I state the hypothesis in 
the null as follows. 
H: There is no difference in tax aggressiveness between private firms and public firms. 
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IV. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES IN GERMANY 
Sample 
The data are gathered from the Hoppenstedt and Orbis databases and consist of a set of 
individual statements of parent companies (unconsolidated) and a set of the respective group 
statements (consolidated). Thus, the sample does not include stand-alone firms. Both datasets are 
merged based on the Hoppenstedt identifier (Hoppensted ID). In order to calculate effective tax 
rates, observations with negative pre-tax income in the group statement or individual statement 
are deleted. Furthermore, I require observations to have data on all control variables, including 
ownership data from the Orbis database, and the sample does not include banks and insurance 
companies. 
The sample period is from 2001 to 2009. In 2001, a classical territorial corporate tax 
system was introduced which changed the taxation of corporate dividends. In 2010, Germany 
changed its local GAAP drastically (Accounting Law Modernization Act) and the book-tax 
conformity was reduced. The final sample consists of two times 3,299 firm-year observations 
(individual statements and group statements). Of these, 2,219 observations are from private firms 
and 1,080 observations from public firms.6 
Research design individual statements 
As mentioned, individual statements are the starting point for the tax return. 
Nevertheless, some adjustments are made afterwards. In Germany, only five percent of the 
dividends are subject to taxation. Furthermore, depreciation of shares in affiliated companies is 
                                                          
6 Unfortunately, tax loss carry-forwards are not observable. If tax loss carry-forwards are equally distributed 
between public and private firms, tax loss carry-forwards would not affect the difference between the two groups. In 
untabulated results, I require firms to have more than one consecutive profitable year, and delete the first year from 
the sample. The idea is that tax loss carry-forwards are already offset in the first year (or at least partly) and thus do 
not affect the effective tax rate calculations in further years. The results do not change qualitatively. 
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not tax-deductible. To really capture the effective tax rate (ETR), pre-tax income is adjusted 
accordingly.7 The effective tax rate is then computed as income tax deflated by adjusted pre-tax 
income.8 As the calculation of ETR does not include deferred taxes, any differences between 
private and public firms consist of permanent differences.9 
PRETAX = Net Income + Total Tax – (Dividends * 0.95) 
                  + Depreciation of Other Financial Assets 
 
 
(1) 
ETR = Income Tax / PRETAX 
 
 
(2) 
If the effective tax rate were just the statutory tax rate multiplied by the pre-tax income, 
we would observe that all firms have exactly the same effective tax rate. However, in reality, we 
observe significant differences in the cross-section of firms. The effective tax rate is different 
from the statutory tax rate, as there are tax exempt revenues and non-tax deductible costs. 
Furthermore, the German legislature allows leeway in recognition and subsequent valuation of 
assets and liabilities (e.g. accelerated depreciation schedules) which influence the effective tax 
rate. Another way to reduce the tax burden in Germany is to strategically optimize the location of 
operations, as each municipality levies a local business tax. Generally, the tax strategies are not 
observable. However, there are multiple items of evidence, apart from the observed cross-
sectional differences in effective tax rates, that firms seek to reduce their tax burden. In 
Germany, for example, 2.4% of all firms in 2014 where subject to tax enforcement actions, and 
firms had to pay an additional 17.9 billion euro in taxes (German Federal Ministry of Finance 
2015). 
                                                          
7 This depreciation is contained in the position “Depreciation of other Financial Assets”. I cannot rule out that other 
deprecation is captured within this position. 
8 I cannot use a cash-tax-based avoidance measure, as German GAAP does not require the publication of a cash flow 
statement. 
9 However, if the tax rate is defined as income tax plus deferred tax deflated by adjusted pre-tax income, the results 
remain constant. 
14 
 
The analyses use OLS regression design. The dependent variable is the effective tax rate 
(ETR) and the main variable of interest is PUBLIC, which is coded one if the respective firm is 
publicly listed and zero otherwise. In line with Chen et al. (2010), I include the variable 
FAMILY, which is coded one if the majority of the shares10 are owned by families. Ownership 
data are based on the last available data in the Orbis Database, and are thus time-invariant. 
However, family ownership is usually long-term investments, as family owners are often the 
founders or founding family of a company. 
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(3) 
 
The subscript “i” indicates that data from individual statements are used. If there is no 
subscript “i”, this means that the variable is the same for individual and group statements (e.g. 
PUBLIC). Control variables are mostly in line with prior literature (e.g. Chen et al. 2010). I 
control for profitability and include return on assets (ROA). Leverage (DEBT) is defined as debt 
over total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Intangible assets 
(INTANG) is defined as intangible assets deflated by total assets. Tax planning activities incur 
fixed costs, and bigger firms are more likely to have the funds to engage in aggressive tax 
planning. Therefore, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. I do not include a market-based 
measure for size or the market-to-book ratio, as the required data are not available for private 
firms. Similar to FAMILY, STATE is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by either 
                                                          
10 The majority of the available shares in the Orbis dataset. On average, information on approximately 70% of the 
shares is available for the sample. 
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the federal republic, the 16 federal states or any municipality.11 Fixed effects are included for 
time (year), industry and legal form12 when indicated. 
The models for the individual statements do not explicitly control for foreign operations 
or subsidiaries in, for example, tax havens. When firms shift profits from Germany to a tax 
haven, the profit would be taxed in the foreign subsidiary. Therefore, profit shifting across 
countries to reduce the tax burden would affect the effective tax rate of only the group statement, 
but not the individual statement. This setting circumvents the problem of estimating the extent to 
which foreign operations are due to operational decisions, due to tax minimization or both. 
Research design group statements 
The research design for the group statements is similar to that for individual statements. 
Effective tax rates and most control variables are calculated in the same way, the only difference 
being that now data from group statements are used instead of data from individual statements 
(indicated by the subscript “g”). In contrast to the effective tax rates of individual statements, 
effective tax rates of group statements are affected by the geographical structure of the group. 
Therefore, the empirical tests for the group statements additionally include #SUBS, which is the 
number of subsidiaries and fixed effects for each foreign country where the subsidiaries are 
located (FEg,SUBS). If, for example, a group has a subsidiary in France and Italy, both fixed 
effects would take on the value of one. Therefore, I control for the influence of foreign income 
on effective tax rates of groups and opportunities for profit shifting. Both the number of 
subsidiaries and the respective countries are time-invariant data from the Orbis database. 
                                                          
11 State ownership in Germany is mostly present in the distribution of gas and electricity, and rarely in public firms 
(see Table 2). The only publicly listed firms that are currently majority owned, directly or indirectly, by the federal 
state/states/municipalities are Deutsche Bahn AG, Deutsche Post AG and Fraport AG (Frankfurt Airport). 
12 Aktiengesellschaft (stock company, corporation) or Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (limited liability 
company). Both forms feature limited liability. 
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Furthermore, the model includes a binary variable IFRS, which is coded one if the group adopted 
the International Financial Reporting Standards for its consolidated statement. 

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(4) 
Findings: Germany 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the individual statements and group 
statements separately for private firms and public firms. Panel A and Panel B provide descriptive 
statistics for the individual statements for private firms (Panel A) and public firms (Panel B). 
Similarly, Panel C and Panel D provide descriptive statistics for the group statements for private 
firms (Panel C) and public firms (Panel D). 
The table shows that the effective tax rates of public firms are lower than those of private 
firms. Within the individual (group) statements, the average effective tax rate of private firms is 
31.0% (32.6%) and the average effective tax rate of public firms is 27.2% (29.4%). Untabulated 
t-tests show that the differences are statistically significant. Similarly, the median effective tax 
rate of public firms is lower in both samples. These univariate comparisons indicate that public 
firms are more tax aggressive than private firms. 
In both samples, private firms are less profitable, have more PPE, are smaller and have 
less intangible assets than public firms. Group statements in accordance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards are prepared by 10.4% of the private firms and 76.4% of the 
public firms. Approximately the same proportion of private firms (16.0%) and public firms 
(16.4%) are majority owned by families (FAMILY). 
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Only 1.7% of the public firms are owned by the state, whereas 18.2% of the private firms 
are majority state owned (STATE). The high ratio of state owned private firms is probably 
explained by the higher number of gas and electricity distributers in Germany (Pierk and Weil 
2016) which are mostly required by EU regulation to be organized as a group (European 
Parliament 2003) and are mostly wholly owned by the respective municipality where they are 
located. On average, public firms have more subsidiaries (159 vs. 93) and these subsidiaries are 
located in more different countries (11.3 vs. 3.2). 
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 provides Pearson correlations for the individual statements below the diagonal 
and Pearson correlations for the group statements above the diagonal. PUBLIC and ETR are 
negatively and significantly correlated within both samples. FAMILY and ETR are positively and 
statistically significantly correlated. Based on these univariate tests and in contrast to the 
common notion that private firms are more tax aggressive, I find that, in fact, public firms are 
more tax aggressive. Furthermore, the results for FAMILY are in line with the findings of Chen et 
al. (2010) that family firms are less tax aggressive. 
ETR is negatively correlated with ROA and PPE. Within the group statements, IFRS is 
negatively correlated with ETR. Furthermore, the effective tax rates of the individual statements 
and the group statements are highly correlated (Pearson: 0.63, not tabulated). The correlation is 
stronger among private firms (Pearson: 0.69, not tabulated) than among public firms (Pearson: 
0.46, not tabulated). The difference could be explained by higher financial reporting incentives 
of public firms in the group statements. 
Insert Table 3 here 
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The multivariate results test the predictions separately for individual statements and for 
group statements. The dependent variable is the effective tax rate (ETR). Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level. Model 1 to Model 4 of Table 4 provide the results for the individual 
statements. First, the results show the univariate association between ETR and PUBLIC (Model 
1), then fixed effects are included (Model 2) and Model 3 controls for other determinants of tax 
aggressiveness. Across all models, the coefficient of PUBLIC is negative and highly significant. 
The coefficient of -0.044 means (Model 3) that the effective tax rate of public firms is 4.4 
percentage points lower than that of private firms. The coefficient of FAMILY is positive, and the 
magnitude and the level of significance is lower than the coefficient of PUBLIC. However, the 
2.3 percentage points difference between family and non-family firms (Model 3) is economically 
significant. The control variables show that more profitable firms (ROA), firms with more PPE 
(PPE), and bigger firms (SIZE) have lower effective tax rates. 
As linear regressions make strong assumptions about linearity, Model 4 uses a subsample 
based on a propensity score matching. The first stage thereby estimates the likelihood of being 
public. Each public firm is then matched with a private firm based on the propensity of being 
publicly listed (nearest neighbour matching with a caliper of 5% and no replacement). The 
sample is reduced to 541 public firm-year observations and 541 private firm-year observations. 
The coefficient of PUBLIC does not change and the coefficient of FAMILY increases to 7.0. The 
very high coefficient of FAMILY could potentially be affected by the low number of family-
owned firms in the matched sample. 
Models 5 to 9 repeat the analyses using data from the group statements. Model 8 includes 
the respective propensity score matched results for the group statements. Here, the sample size is 
reduced to 352 public firm-year observations and 352 private firm-year observations. The 
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coefficients of PUBLIC are negative and statistically significant across all models. Control 
variables show qualitatively the same results. Furthermore, Model 7 shows that firms using 
International Financial Reporting Standards have lower effective tax rates. This could be due to 
either self-selection of tax aggressive firms into IFRS adopters or the inflation of earnings by 
IFRS. This in turn increases the denominator of the effective tax rate measure and leads to lower 
effective tax rates. 
To rule out that different GAAP systems bias the results, the last model “No IFRS” limits 
the sample to consolidated firms that did not adopt International Financial Reporting Standards. 
There are two main reasons why German publicly listed firms in the EU are not using IFRS after 
1 January 2005. First, some firms were allowed to postpone IFRS introduction by two years (e.g. 
firms which were cross-listed in the United States and which prepared their consolidated 
financial statements in accordance with US GAAP). Second, firms listed on exchange-regulated 
stock exchanges (e.g. the Entry Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange) are not required to 
use IFRS and may still choose between the two GAAP systems (European Parliament 2002, 
article 4). The results show that the coefficient is negative (-0.094) and statistically significant. 
This difference between public and private firms in Model 9 (No IFRS) seems to be very high. 
However, firms listed on exchange-regulated markets are usually young and only recently went 
public, as the Entry Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange was instituted only in 2005. Thus, 
these firms are more likely to be in the early stage of the life cycle and, consequently, might have 
a higher likelihood of having losses and tax loss carry-forwards which negatively affect the 
effective tax rate. 
In a nutshell, Table 4 suggests that public firms are more tax aggressive. The effective tax 
rates of public firms are between 4.4 percentage points (Model 3) and 4.6 percentage points 
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(Model 7) lower than those of private firms. Thus, the direction and magnitude of the results are 
very similar for individual statements and group statements. Furthermore, as stated, the effective 
tax rates are highly correlated between individual statements and group statements. I conclude 
that public firms are more tax aggressive, not only domestically at the level of individual 
statements but also for the entire group as shown by group statements. 
Insert Table 4 here 
V. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES IN EUROPE 
Institutional setting 
This section addresses the question as to whether the results of the detailed German 
analyses are generalizable to other countries. Table 5 provides a brief overview of the different 
tax and financial accounting regimes of the European sample. Panel A of Table 5 indicates that in 
all countries but Belgium, tax consolidation is allowed at least under some circumstances. 
Although almost all countries officially levy tax on worldwide income, all countries exempt 
between 95% and 100% of foreign dividends/income when certain conditions are met. Tax loss 
carry-forward periods vary among countries and range between 10 years and infinity. France, 
Germany and Norway allow firms to carry back losses, but the carry-back amount is limited. The 
tax rules are the same for public and private firms, and thus allow for comparisons between 
public and private firms. 
All countries of the sample adopted, in line with the so-called IAS regulation, the 
International Financial Reporting Standards for the consolidated statements of listed companies. 
It is a Member State option to permit, prohibit or require the International Financial Reporting 
Standards for unlisted firms and for individual statements. Panel B of Table 5 shows that all 
countries of the sample permit International Financial Reporting Standards for consolidated 
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statements of unlisted firms. Most countries require national accounting standards for individual 
statements. Finland and Norway permit the application of International Financial Reporting 
Standards for individual statements of unlisted firms and listed firms, while Italy permits their 
application for unlisted firms and requires their application for listed firms. 
Insert Table 5 here 
Sample and research design 
In the European sample, I use European individual and group statements from the Orbis 
database. The first search criterion was the consolidation code “C2/U2 (companies with both 
types of accounts)” to ensure that both the individual and group statements were available. Next, 
data on individual statements and group statements were downloaded separately and merged 
based on the Bureau van Dijk identifier. The sample period covers all available data from 2005 
to 2014. Due to data availability and further restrictions, (for example not every country has a 
sophisticated stock market), I limit the sample to eight European countries (Belgium, Germany, 
Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Spain and Sweden) and delete banks, insurance companies and 
non-profit organizations.13 In order to compute effective tax rates, the sample contains only firm-
year observations with positive pre-tax income. In total, the sample contains 46,530 firm-year 
observations. 
The analyses are mainly the same as in the German sample. The dependent variable is 
ETR and the main variable of interest is PUBLIC, which is coded one if the respective firm is 
publicly listed and zero otherwise. The only difference is that PRETAX is not adjusted in the 
                                                          
13 Countries are included if at least 30 firm-year observations of private firms and 30 firm-year observations of 
public firms are available. In some countries, matching the individual statements of the parent with the group 
statement led to an insufficient number of observations, e.g. the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
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European sample. Model 3 is used for individual statements and Model 4 is used for group 
statements. 
Findings: Europe 
Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics separately for private and public firms, and for 
individual and group statements. Panel A and Panel B show that the effective tax rate of public 
firms (Panel B, 23.2%) is lower than the effective tax rate of private firms (Panel A, 27.1%) in 
the individual statements. Similar results can be found for the effective tax rates of group 
statements. The effective tax rate of public firms is 30.3% and of private firms is 32.9%. This 
offers initial evidence that the public firms are also more tax aggressive across the European 
sample. 
Panel E of Table 6 shows the average effective tax rate for each country. In five out of 
eight countries (Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy and Spain), the effective tax rate of public 
firms is statistically significantly lower than that of private firms, within both the individual 
statements and the consolidated statements. For Sweden, the effect can be found only within the 
group statements. Only in France and Norway are public firms not more tax aggressive than 
private firms. 
Insert Table 6 here 
Table 7 provides the multivariate regression results for the European sample for 
individual statements. The first column “All” includes observations from all European countries 
in the sample. The model uses country, time and industry fixed effects, and standard errors are 
clustered at country level.14 The models for Spain (ES) and Norway (NO) do not include the 
                                                          
14 The results remain statistically significant when clustering standard errors at firm level. 
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interaction term of PUBLIC and FAMILY, as there is no intersection of the two variables in the 
sample of these two countries. The country-level regressions of the Norway, Finland and Italy do 
not control for International Financial Reporting Standards, although these countries permit 
International Financial Reporting Standard for individual statements. The database reports 
“Local GAAP” for all firms in the Norwegian and Finish sample. Thus, I cannot include the 
respective control. Untabulated results show that controlling for IFRS in the Italian sample does 
not change the coefficient of PUBLIC.   
In line with the German sample, public firms have, on average, a 2.4 percentage point 
lower effective tax rate than private firms. Size and profitability (ROA) are negatively associated 
with effective tax rates. The next models investigate the research question separately for each 
country. In five out of eight countries, public firms have statistically significantly lower effective 
tax rates than private firms (Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy and Spain). In the remaining three 
countries (France, Norway and Sweden), the coefficients of PUBLIC do not show statistical 
significance. 
Insert Table 7 here 
Table 8 reports the European analyses for the group statements. The country-level 
regressions of the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden) do not control for 
International Financial Reporting Standards. The database reports “Local GAAP” for all firms. 
However, at least the publicly listed firms of the sample are required to use International 
Financial Reporting Standards. Public firms have a statistically significantly lower effective tax 
rate with approximately the same magnitude (2.0 percentage points). In all but one country 
(France) the coefficient of PUBLIC is negative, and in four countries it is statistically significant. 
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Overall, the effect is similar to the individual statements, and public firms have lower effective 
tax rates and are thus considered as more tax aggressive. 
Insert Table 8 here 
VI. CORROBORATING RESULTS 
Conforming tax avoidance 
Measures of tax avoidance (e.g. effective tax rates or book-tax differences) generally 
provide information about non-conforming tax avoidance, but not about conforming tax 
avoidance. However, prior literature shows that firms also engage in conforming tax strategies 
(e.g. Guenther 1994, Maydew 1997). In my setting, using individual statements, both types of 
firms have the same opportunities to engage in non-conforming and conforming tax avoidance, 
as capital market participants do not use individual statements. Given this setting, to the best of 
my knowledge, there is no rationale as to why public firms are more tax aggressive when using 
non-conforming tax strategies but not more tax aggressive when using conforming tax strategies. 
Nevertheless, I use tax expense deflated by lagged total assets as a proxy that captures 
both conforming and non-conforming tax avoidance.15 The upside of using this measure is that 
the denominator is not influenced by current year’s earnings management or conforming tax 
strategies. The downside is that this measure assumes that public and private firms have a similar 
asset structure that generates similar taxable profits. Furthermore, if public firms smooth 
earnings more or take earnings big baths more often, this would influence the amount of taxes 
paid, and in this case private and public firms are hardly comparable. However, if I still find the 
effect that public firms are more tax aggressive, this indicates that the results are robust to 
                                                          
15 The measure is motivated by Badertscher et al. (2016), who use the ratio of cash taxes paid to lagged total assets. 
However, cash taxes paid is not available in a European setting. 
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conforming tax strategies and at the same time justifies the use of such tax avoidance measures. 
For a more detailed discussion of conforming and non-conforming tax avoidance, see 
Badertscher et al. (2016). 
Panel A of Table 9 provides the results of the individual statement, and Panel B the 
results of the group statements. The number of observations is reduced in both samples, as the 
dependent variable is deflated by lagged total assets and is not available for all firm-years. In 
both samples I still find that public firms are more tax aggressive, as the coefficients of PUBLIC 
is negative and statistically significant in both samples (columns “All”). The country-by-country 
analyses show that the effect can be found in some countries, but not all. Nevertheless, based on 
the rationale that there is no theoretical argument as to why we would expect to find different 
results for a joint measure of conforming and non-conforming tax aggressiveness, and based on 
the findings of Table 9, I conclude that public firms are more tax aggressive. 
Insert Table 9 here 
IPOs in Europe 
In this section, I limit the sample to firms that carried out an IPO within the sample 
period. This allows me to investigate whether there is a change after the IPO in tax 
aggressiveness. The sample contains 520 firm-year observations of 99 unique firms that carried 
out an IPO where I have at least one observation in the pre-IPO period and one in the post-IPO 
period. The analyses include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant characteristics. 
Furthermore, year fixed effects control for time effects (e.g. changes in statutory tax rates). As 
the IPO dates are not clustered in time, I do not include a control sample. Thus, I test whether 
changing the listing status from “not listed” to “publicly listed” has an effect on tax 
aggressiveness. 
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Table 10 contains the respective regression results. Model 1 and Model 2 are based on 
individual statements, and Model 3 and Model 4 are based on group statements. As all models 
include firm fixed-effects, all time invariant variables are not used (e.g. FAMILY, PUBLIC, 
#SUBS). The results show that firms have lower effective tax rates after an IPO. The coefficient 
of -0.033 in Model 1, for instance, can be interpreted as a 3.3 percentage point reduction in the 
effective tax rate after the IPO. The effect remains qualitatively the same when including time 
and firm fixed effects for both the individual and group statements. In Model 2 and Model 4, the 
coefficients are only close to statistical significance (P-Values 10.2 and 14.1, respectively) but 
the economic effect is similar. Table 10 indicates that when firms carry out an IPO, they are 
more tax aggressive afterwards. 
Insert Table 10 here 
Long-run effective tax rate 
The sample so far does not contain firms with negative pre-tax income. This selection 
could potentially affect the results if losses, and thus tax loss offsetting, is not equally distributed 
among private and public firms. As effective tax rates of firm-years with negative pre-tax income 
are not meaningful, I cannot include them in my sample. However, it is reasonable to compute 
long-run effective tax rates over several years and exclude firms only where the sum of the pre-
tax income is negative. This has several advantages. First, the sample selection problem is 
reduced, as firm-years with negative pre-tax income are included. Second, this approach reduces 
the problem of tax loss offsetting. And third, Dyreng et al. (2008) show that annual effective tax 
rates are not necessarily predictive for the long-run tax avoidance strategy. 
In Table 11, the dependent variable is the average effective tax rate. I include only firms 
with data on the full sample period of 10 years (including loss years). This sample period ensures 
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that the average effective tax rates are computed using the same years and thus the same 
statutory tax rates. Otherwise it could be problematic if, for example, public firms are more 
likely to have data on the full sample period, but data on private firms are more likely to be 
available in later years where the statutory tax rates are lower. The previous analyses controlled 
for this using time fixed effects. This is not possible in the long-run analyses, as only one 
observation per firm is included. In total, the analyses include 1,764 unique firms. 
In line with Gallemore and Labro (2015), I include the average of the control variables 
over time. Model 1 (Model 4) includes only the main variable of interest, PUBLIC, and the 
results show a significantly negative coefficient of -0.038 (-0.044). When including fixed effects 
and control variables, the coefficient becomes less negative and amounts to -0.022 and -0.031 
(Model 5 and Model 6). 
Insert Table 11 here 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The common notion is that private firms are more tax aggressive, as they face lower non-
tax costs of financial reporting. In contrast, this paper provides evidence that public firms, not 
private firms, are more tax aggressive. The results can be found within individual and group 
statements. Furthermore, I find the mentioned effect in a detailed analysis using German data and 
confirm the generalizability of the results in other European countries. However, there seem to 
be differences between countries, as in some countries the effect is absent. Thus, future research 
may identify reasons for these cross-country differences. Nevertheless, the common notion that 
private firms are more tax aggressive seems to be premature. 
The differences in effective tax rates between public and private are highly significant. 
However, I cannot observe the costs associated with tax aggressiveness. Thus, the benefit of, for 
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example, a 4 percentage point reduction in the effective tax rates must be evaluated against the 
costs of tax planning, assuming that companies choose their optimal level of tax planning 
activities. However, the differences are still very important and should be interesting for 
investors in evaluating benefits and risks associated with the respective investment, and for 
policy makers in planning enforcement activities. 
A caveat of this paper is that public firms are defined by being listed on equity markets. 
Thus, I do not control for the existence of public debt in the sample of private firms. However, in 
most European countries – and in Germany in particular – it is not common that firms with non-
listed equity engage in public debt markets. Instead, private firms use a close relationship with 
banks or even only one specific (house) bank (Harhoff and Körting 1998). 
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Appendix A: Example of calculating effective tax rates in Germany 
Panel A: Assumptions    
  Parent Subsidiary 1: DE Subsidiary 2: ES  
Location Germany Germany Spain  
Statutory tax rate 30% 30% 20%  
Pre-tax profit 100 100 100  
Payout to parent  Direct transfer Dividend payout to P  
  (before tax) (after tax)  
     
     
Panel B: Calculation of effective tax rates   
  Individual Statements Group Statement 
  Parent Subsidiary 1: DE Subsidiary 2: ES Parent 
Pre-tax Profit 100 100 100 300 
Payout to parent 100 -100 0 0 
TAXBASE 200 0 100 300 
Tax -60  -20 -80 
After-tax profit 140  80 220 
Dividends 80  -80 0 
Net income 220  0 220 
     
ETR (Parent) 0.300 (60/200) 0.267 (80/300) 
Individual statements: In this example, a German parent company wholly owns two subsidiaries. 
Subsidiary 1 is located in Germany and Subsidiary 2 is located in Spain. All three companies have a pre-
tax profit of 100. The German subsidiary transfers its pre-tax profit to the parent company, and the 
respective profit is taxed at the level of the parent company. Thus, the tax base of the parent company is 
200 and the parent company pays 60 to the tax authorities. The Spanish subsidiary pays the domestic tax 
and pays out dividends to the parent company. As Germany has a territorial tax system, no further taxes 
are due. The dividends are not included in the tax base of the parent company, and thus the effective tax 
rate of the parent remains unchanged. If the Spanish subsidiary does not pay out dividends, the effective 
tax rate would not change either. This is a simplified example (e.g. Germany taxes 5% of foreign 
dividends with the German statutory tax rate). 
Group statement: From a group perspective, no transfer of profits or dividend payouts took place. Thus, 
the pre-tax profit is 300. Unless additional disclosure shows precisely where the profits are earned, it is 
not possible to observe tax aggressiveness, as the composition of statutory tax rates is not observable. 
Additionally, financial reporting incentives could affect the effective tax rate of the group, e.g. if earnings 
are overstated or understated (not in this example). 
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Table 1. Institutional Setting - German Sample 
Panel A: Differences between individual and group statements in Germany 
Account Private Firms Public Firms 
Individual Statements German GAAP German GAAP 
  - Starting point to calculate taxes - Starting point to calculate taxes 
Group Statements German GAAP or IFRS IFRS 
  - Provide information - Provide information 
 
Panel B: What do effective tax rates of parent companies capture? 
Account  Private Firms  Public Firms 
Individual Statements  Domestic tax strategies Domestic tax strategies 
  (Parent + all domestic subsidiaries) (Parent + all domestic subsidiaries) 
Group Statements Worldwide tax strategies Worldwide tax strategies 
  + Financial reporting incentives + Financial reporting incentives, 
  No capital market incentives  Capital market incentives 
This table describes the institutional setting in Germany.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics – German sample     
Panel A: Private firms – Individual statements 
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETRi,t 2,219 0.310 0.200 0.001 0.147 0.316 0.427 0.886 
ROAi,t 2,219 0.066 0.068 0.001 0.021 0.045 0.085 0.399 
DEBTi,t 2,219 0.566 0.211 0.035 0.428 0.585 0.720 0.940 
PPEi,t 2,219 0.273 0.271 0.000 0.048 0.174 0.443 0.925 
INTANGi,t 2,219 0.013 0.030 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.234 
SIZEi,t 2,219 18.651 1.345 15.393 17.708 18.512 19.438 23.704 
FAMILY 2,219 0.160 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
STATE 2,219 0.182 0.386 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: Public firms – Individual statements 
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETRi,t 1,080 0.272 0.183 0.001 0.123 0.273 0.381 0.886 
ROAi,t 1,080 0.084 0.077 0.001 0.034 0.060 0.104 0.399 
DEBTi,t 1,080 0.418 0.216 0.035 0.245 0.428 0.590 0.925 
PPEi,t 1,080 0.129 0.179 0.000 0.009 0.052 0.184 0.925 
INTANGi,t 1,080 0.016 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.012 0.234 
SIZEi,t 1,080 18.828 1.792 15.393 17.529 18.569 19.842 23.704 
FAMILY 1,080 0.164 0.370 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
STATE 1,080 0.017 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel C: Private firms – Group statements 
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETRg,t 2,219 0.326 0.177 0.004 0.214 0.330 0.423 0.842 
ROAg,t 2,219 0.053 0.051 0.001 0.019 0.038 0.069 0.305 
DEBTg,t 2,219 0.655 0.171 0.152 0.556 0.674 0.773 0.993 
PPEg,t 2,219 0.369 0.270 0.001 0.135 0.308 0.604 0.918 
INTANGg,t 2,219 0.040 0.075 0.000 0.003 0.011 0.039 0.542 
SIZEg,t 2,219 18.999 1.362 16.014 18.027 18.843 19.749 24.281 
FAMILY 2,219 0.160 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
STATE 2,219 0.182 0.386 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
#SUBSg 2,219 93.034 204.995 1.000 8.000 19.000 67.000 1431.000 
#COUNTRg 2,219 3.211 8.530 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 70.000 
IFRSg,t 2,219 0.104 0.305 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel D: Public firms – Group statements 
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETRg,t 1,080 0.294 0.153 0.004 0.184 0.300 0.385 0.842 
ROAg,t 1,080 0.074 0.064 0.001 0.031 0.056 0.093 0.305 
DEBTg,t 1,080 0.557 0.194 0.152 0.407 0.588 0.700 0.993 
PPEg,t 1,080 0.173 0.191 0.001 0.040 0.104 0.231 0.918 
INTANGg,t 1,080 0.113 0.140 0.000 0.011 0.053 0.166 0.542 
SIZEg,t 1,080 19.234 1.840 16.014 17.930 18.934 20.225 24.281 
FAMILY 1,080 0.164 0.370 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
STATE  1,080 0.017 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
#SUBSg 1,080 159.242 308.891 1.000 15.000 39.000 131.000 1431.000 
#COUNTRg 1,080 11.337 17.663 0.000 1.000 6.000 13.000 148.000 
IFRSg,t 1,080 0.764 0.425 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
This table provides summary statistics of the German sample. ETR is income tax divided by PRETAX. PRETAX is 
calculated as net income plus total tax minus 0.95*dividends plus depreciation of financial assets. ROA is return 
on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. 
INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. FAMILY is 
coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority of the shares is 
owned by either the federal republic, the 16 states or any municipality. #SUBS is the number of subsidiaries of the 
group. #COUNTR is the number of different countries where the subsidiaries are located. IFRS is coded one if the 
financial statement is prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards. All non-
dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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Table 3. Pearson correlations   
  Group Statements 
   ETRg,t  DEBTg,t  INTANGg,t FAMILY #SUBSg  IFRSg,t 
  Variable  PUBLICt ROAg,t  PPEg,t  SIZEg,t  STATE  #COUNTRg 
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 S
ta
te
m
en
ts
 
PUBLICt  -0.09*** 0.18*** -0.25*** -0.35*** 0.33*** 0.07*** 0.01 -0.23*** 0.13*** 0.30*** 0.66*** 
ETRi,t -0.09***  -0.20*** 0.08*** -0.06*** 0.01 0.01 0.04** -0.05*** 0.02 0.04** -0.12*** 
ROAi,t 0.12*** -0.12***  -0.40*** -0.31*** 0.04** -0.15*** 0.16*** -0.18*** 0.03* 0.07*** 0.18*** 
DEBTi,t -0.31*** 0.06*** -0.34***  0.20*** -0.09*** 0.17*** -0.08*** 0.14*** 0.02 -0.02 -0.24*** 
PPEi,t -0.27*** -0.06*** -0.21*** 0.26***  -0.35*** 0.07*** -0.13*** 0.50*** -0.16*** -0.25*** -0.44*** 
INTANGi,t 0.04** 0.01 0.01 0.04** -0.08***  0.11*** 0.02 -0.17*** 0.10*** 0.25*** 0.39*** 
SIZEi,t 0.06*** -0.05*** -0.12*** 0.17*** 0.06*** -0.11***  -0.14*** 0.04** 0.37*** 0.53*** 0.17*** 
FAMILY 0.01 0.04** 0.15*** -0.07*** -0.11*** 0.06*** -0.15***  -0.17*** -0.12*** 0.05*** -0.05*** 
STATE -0.23*** 0.01 -0.11*** 0.08*** 0.30*** -0.08*** 0.00 -0.17***   -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.23*** 
            0.38*** 0.18*** 
             0.31*** 
The table provides Pearson correlations for individual statements below the diagonal and Pearson correlations for group statements above the diagonal. ETR is 
income tax divided by PRETAX. PRETAX is calculated as net income plus total tax minus 0.95*dividends plus depreciation of financial assets. ROA is return 
on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total 
assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority 
of the shares is owned by either the federal republic, the 16 states or any municipality. #SUBS is the number of subsidiaries of the group. #COUNTR is the 
number of different countries where the subsidiaries are located. IFRS is coded one if the financial statement is prepared in accordance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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Table 4. Regressions – Effective tax rates  
  Individual Statements Group Statements 
ETRi/g,t (1) (2) (3) (4) PSM (5) (6) (7) (8) PSM (9) No IFRS 
Constant 0.310*** 0.423*** 0.626*** 0.429*** 0.326*** 0.385*** 0.630*** 0.525*** 0.779*** 
 (0.006) (0.023) (0.063) (0.097) (0.005) (0.021) (0.077) (0.182) (0.100) 
PUBLICt -0.038*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.032*** -0.051*** -0.046*** -0.049* -0.094*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.026) (0.022) 
FAMILY    0.023 0.070**     0.027** 0.032 0.031** 
   (0.016) (0.034)   (0.013) (0.040) (0.015) 
PUBLICt*FAMILY   -0.002 -0.046   -0.032 -0.038 0.030 
   (0.027) (0.040)   (0.023) (0.060) (0.036) 
ROAi/g,t   -0.403*** -0.282***   -0.832*** -1.081*** -0.980*** 
   (0.063) (0.095)   (0.075) (0.151) (0.096) 
DEBTi/g,t   0.020 -0.019   0.003 0.073 0.003 
   (0.023) (0.037)   (0.024) (0.069) (0.031) 
PPEi/g,t   -0.067*** 0.050   -0.073*** -0.039 -0.078*** 
   (0.021) (0.034)   (0.025) (0.057) (0.029) 
INTANGi/g,t   0.021 -0.078   0.057 0.008 0.208*** 
   (0.137) (0.183)   (0.045) (0.104) (0.074) 
SIZEi/g,t   -0.010*** 0.000   -0.011** -0.011 -0.019*** 
   (0.003) (0.005)   (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) 
STATE   0.008 -0.044   -0.005 -0.004 0.001 
   (0.017) (0.034)   (0.018) (0.044) (0.018) 
ln(#SUBSg)       0.003 0.001 0.006 
       (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
IFRSg,t       -0.017 -0.019  
       (0.012) (0.026)  
Sub Country FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time, Ind., & LF FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.008 0.079 0.109 0.113 0.008 0.166 0.233 0.382 0.254 
N 3,299 3,299 3,299 1,082 3,299 3,299 3,299 704 2,244 
The table provides OLS regression results using data from individual statements in Model 1 to Model 4 and data from group statements in Model 5 to Model 9. 
The dependent variable is ETR, which is income tax divided by PRETAX. PUBLIC is coded one if the respective firm is publicly listed. ROA is return on 
assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority of the 
shares is owned by either the federal republic, the 16 states or any municipality. #SUBS is the number of subsidiaries of the group. IFRS is coded one if the 
financial statement is prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards. The models include fixed effects for time, industry (Ind.), legal 
form (LF) and countries of the subsidiaries (Sub Country) when indicated. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and are provided within the parentheses 
below the coefficients. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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Table 5. Institutional Setting – European sample 
Panel A: Taxation 
Country Tax Consolidation Tax Base Participation Exemption Loss relief forward1 Loss relief backward1 Limited relief2  
BE (Belgium) No Worldwide Yes (max 95%) ∞ 0 No  
DE (Germany) Yes Worldwide Yes (max 95%) ∞ 1* Yes  
ES (Spain) Yes Worldwide Yes (max 100%) 15 0 No  
FI (Finland) Limited Worldwide Yes (max 100%) 10 0 No  
FR (France) Yes Territorial Yes (max 95%) ∞ 1* Yes  
IT (Italy) Yes Worldwide Yes (max 95%) ∞ 0 Yes  
NO (Norway) Limited Worldwide Yes (max 100%) ∞ 0** No  
SE (Sweden) Limited Worldwide Yes (max 100%) ∞ 0 No  
(1) in years (2) also known as minimum taxation * Maximum of 1 million. ** 2 years for liquidation losses. Data is based on the most recent Deloitte tax guides 
(https://dits.deloitte.com/#TaxGuides, last access: March 28, 2016).  
 
Panel B: Financial Accounting 
  Individual Statements Group Statements 
Country Unlisted Listed1 Unlisted Listed1 
BE (Belgium)2 Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP / IFRS IFRS 
DE (Germany) Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP / IFRS IFRS 
ES (Spain) Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP / IFRS IFRS 
FI (Finland) Local GAAP / IFRS Local GAAP / IFRS Local GAAP / IFRS IFRS 
FR (France) Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP / IFRS IFRS 
IT (Italy)3 Local GAAP / IFRS IFRS Local GAAP / IFRS IFRS 
NO (Norway) Local GAAP / IFRS Local GAAP / IFRS Local GAAP / IFRS IFRS 
SE (Sweden)4 Local GAAP Local GAAP Local GAAP / IFRS IFRS 
(1) Listed on a EU regulated market. (2) Individual Statements: IFRS required for investment firms as of 2007; Group statements: IFRS required for unlisted banks, 
insurance companies, and investment firms as of 2006 (3) Individual Statements: IFRS required for banks, IFRS not allowed for very small companies and insurance 
companies; Group statements: IFRS required for banks and insurance companies, not allowed for very small unlisted companies (4) Group statements: IFRS required for 
banks, insurance companies, and investment firms. Data is based on the most recent jurisdiction profile of the IFRS Foundation and the IASB (http://www.ifrs.org/use-
around-the-world/pages/jurisdiction-profiles.aspx, last access: March 28, 2016).  
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics – European sample     
Panel A: Private firms – Individual statements 
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETRi,t 43,693 0.271 0.175 0.001 0.159 0.268 0.342 0.873 
ROAi,t 43,693 0.108 0.112 0.002 0.034 0.073 0.141 0.666 
DEBTi,t 43,693 0.652 0.227 0.053 0.493 0.680 0.836 1.000 
PPEi,t 43,693 0.529 0.264 -0.259 0.352 0.555 0.730 0.988 
INTANGi,t 43,693 0.022 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.400 
SIZEi,t 43,693 10.283 1.720 5.186 9.117 10.315 11.346 14.843 
FAMILY 43,693 0.365 0.481 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
STATE 43,693 0.052 0.221 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
IFRSi,t 43,693 0.011 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: Public firms – Individual statements 
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETRi,t 2,837 0.232 0.155 0.001 0.108 0.236 0.321 0.873 
ROAi,t 2,837 0.100 0.090 0.002 0.040 0.073 0.129 0.666 
DEBTi,t 2,837 0.740 0.179 0.093 0.635 0.769 0.876 1.000 
PPEi,t 2,837 0.516 0.255 -0.259 0.346 0.546 0.712 0.988 
INTANGi,t 2,837 0.034 0.071 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.025 0.400 
SIZEi,t 2,837 12.226 1.780 6.595 10.830 12.050 13.729 14.843 
FAMILY 2,837 0.140 0.347 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
STATE 2,837 0.019 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
IFRSi,t 2,837 0.132 0.338 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel C: Private firms – Group statements 
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETRg,t 43,693 0.329 0.157 0.002 0.252 0.297 0.383 0.879 
ROAg,t 43,693 0.095 0.085 0.003 0.037 0.071 0.126 0.607 
DEBTg,t 43,693 0.599 0.213 0.064 0.447 0.619 0.768 0.999 
PPEg,t 43,693 0.453 0.272 -0.319 0.278 0.489 0.656 0.974 
INTANGg,t 43,693 0.049 0.090 0.000 0.002 0.013 0.047 0.480 
SIZEg,t 43,693 10.691 1.666 5.220 9.612 10.664 11.676 15.133 
FAMILY 43,693 0.365 0.481 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
STATE  43,693 0.052 0.221 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
#SUBSg 43,693 56.823 180.065 1.000 4.000 8.000 19.000 1285.000 
#COUNTRg 43,693 2.382 4.512 0.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 87.000 
IFRSg,t 43,693 0.093 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel D: Public firms – Group statements 
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETRg,t 2,837 0.303 0.136 0.002 0.235 0.295 0.356 0.879 
ROAg,t 2,837 0.102 0.083 0.003 0.048 0.078 0.127 0.607 
DEBTg,t 2,837 0.688 0.166 0.064 0.594 0.720 0.810 0.999 
PPEg,t 2,837 0.278 0.329 -0.319 0.013 0.320 0.529 0.974 
INTANGg,t 2,837 0.144 0.145 0.000 0.023 0.089 0.232 0.480 
SIZEg,t 2,837 12.533 1.833 5.579 11.078 12.439 14.156 15.133 
FAMILY 2,837 0.140 0.347 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
STATE  2,837 0.019 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
#SUBSg 2,837 129.671 255.269 1.000 11.000 32.000 93.000 1285.000 
#COUNTRg 2,837 12.966 17.988 0.000 2.000 6.000 16.000 148.000 
IFRSg,t 2,837 0.640 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Continued on next page 
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Table 6 continued 
 
Panel E: Effective tax rates by country 
  N Individual Consolidated 
Country Private Public Private Public Delta Private Public Delta 
BE (Belgium) 989 84 0.220  0.182  -0.038*  0.333  0.295  -0.038**  
DE (Germany) 6,895 1,408 0.265  0.216  -0.049***  0.316  0.299  -0.017***  
ES (Spain) 4,967 110 0.246  0.200  -0.046***  0.291  0.247  -0.044***  
FI (Finland) 5,098 276 0.236  0.210  -0.026***  0.262  0.245  -0.017***  
FR (France) 2,786 184 0.217  0.223  0.006  0.315  0.304  -0.011  
IT (Italy) 9,188 420 0.417  0.334  -0.083***  0.471  0.401  -0.070***  
NO (Norway) 9,673 135 0.210  0.235  0.025**  0.287  0.300  0.013  
SE (Sweden) 4,097 220 0.223  0.210  -0.013  0.273  0.244  -0.029***  
Total / Average 43,693 2,837 0.271  0.232  -0.039***  0.329  0.303  -0.026***  
This table provides summary statistics of the European sample. ETR is total tax expense divided by pre-tax 
income. ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
thousand total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. STATE is coded 
one if the majority of the shares is owned by either the federal republic, the states or any municipality. #SUBS is 
the number of subsidiaries of the group. #COUNTR is the number of different countries where the subsidiaries are 
located. IFRS is coded one if the financial statement is prepared in accordance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark 
significance at the 1/5/10% level 
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Table 7. Regressions – Effective tax rates of individual statements  
ETRi,t ALL BE DE ES FI FR IT NO SE 
Constant 0.441*** 0.369*** 0.421*** 0.383*** 0.322*** 0.426*** 0.706*** 0.420*** 0.397*** 
 (0.048) (0.071) (0.026) (0.024) (0.038) (0.115) (0.036) (0.016) (0.021) 
PUBLICt -0.024** -0.015 -0.033*** -0.023* -0.017 0.025** -0.041*** 0.021 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) 
FAMILY 0.003*** 0.049** 0.008* 0.011*** 0.003 0.052*** 0.005 -0.024*** 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.030) 
PUBLICt* -0.007*** -0.284*** -0.008   -0.058*** -0.045* 0.008   -0.017 
FAMILY (0.010) (0.038) (0.012)   (0.020) (0.024) (0.033)   (0.036) 
ROAi,t -0.317** -0.231*** -0.130*** -0.210*** -0.242*** -0.158*** -0.911*** -0.300*** -0.354*** 
 (0.078) (0.052) (0.027) (0.021) (0.017) (0.038) (0.034) (0.010) (0.019) 
DEBTi,t -0.099 -0.122*** -0.026** -0.030*** 0.027** -0.041*** -0.187*** -0.133*** 0.026** 
 (0.040) (0.025) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) 
PPEi,t -0.058*** -0.031 -0.059*** -0.054*** -0.060*** -0.066*** -0.099*** -0.015*** -0.082*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) 
INTANGi,t 0.073 -0.044 0.117** -0.048 0.069 0.034 0.111*** 0.252*** -0.061 
 (0.046) (0.112) (0.058) (0.031) (0.043) (0.046) (0.032) (0.031) (0.045) 
SIZEi,t -0.006*** -0.014*** -0.002* -0.003* -0.005*** -0.001 -0.015*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
STATE 0.043*** -0.084** 0.063*** -0.014 0.016 0.030* 0.039*** 0.018* -0.001 
  (0.011) (0.041) (0.009) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) 
Country FE Yes No No No No No No No No 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.266 0.212 0.061 0.085 0.078 0.093 0.257 0.121 0.132 
N 46,530 1,073 8,303 5,077 5,374 2,970 9,608 9,808 4,317 
The table provides OLS regression results using European data from individual statements. ETR is total tax expense divided by pre-tax income. PUBLIC is coded 
one if the respective firm is publicly listed. ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total 
assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of thousand total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the 
shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by either the federal republic, the states or any municipality. Standard 
errors are clustered at country level in the Model “All”. Otherwise the models use robust standard errors and are provided within the parentheses below the 
coefficients. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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Table 8. Regressions – Effective tax rates of group statements  
ETRg,t ALL BE DE ES FI FR IT NO SE 
Constant 0.483*** 0.519*** 0.440*** 0.377*** 0.347*** 0.424*** 0.733*** 0.417*** 0.415*** 
 (0.045) (0.100) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.052) (0.042) (0.015) (0.018) 
PUBLICt -0.020*** -0.042 -0.031*** -0.033** -0.041*** 0.015 -0.024** -0.004 -0.015 
 (0.005) (0.033) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) 
FAMILY 0.007** 0.054* 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.004 0.042*** -0.011*** 0.003 0.032 
 (0.004) (0.031) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.028) 
PUBLICt* -0.010 -0.039  0.008  -0.013 -0.070 0.009  -0.019 
FAMILY (0.008) (0.088) (0.011)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.030)  (0.031) 
ROAg,t -0.320** -0.124* -0.233*** -0.164*** -0.212*** -0.101** -1.112*** -0.291*** -0.270*** 
(0.097) (0.068) (0.037) (0.024) (0.017) (0.049) (0.040) (0.014) (0.020) 
DEBTg,t -0.062*** -0.047 -0.032*** -0.039*** 0.024** -0.028* -0.090*** -0.086*** 0.014 
(0.023) (0.037) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) 
PPEg,t -0.015 0.047 -0.043*** -0.014 -0.025*** 0.010 0.006 0.002 -0.046*** 
(0.009) (0.034) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) 
INTANGg,t 0.145*** 0.562*** 0.073** 0.003 0.239*** 0.044 0.236*** 0.245*** 0.092*** 
(0.039) (0.093) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) 
SIZEg,t -0.009*** -0.028*** -0.003* -0.001 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.025*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
STATE 0.034*** -0.044 0.046*** -0.032* 0.002 -0.021 0.034*** 0.017 0.024*** 
(0.009) (0.076) (0.008) (0.017) (0.010) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
ln(#SUBSg) 0.003** 0.014*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.003** 0.006*** 0.003** 0.004*** -0.001 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
IFRSg,t 
  
-0.006 -0.002 -0.013* -0.002  0.153*** -0.023***   
(0.009) (0.035) (0.007) (0.012)  (0.016) (0.007)   
Sub C. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes No No No No No No No No 
Time/Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.295 0.312 0.086 0.104 0.143 0.181 0.294 0.164 0.177 
N 46,530 1,073 8,303 5,077 5,374 2,970 9,608 9,808 4,317 
The table provides OLS regression results using European data from group statements. ETR is total tax expense divided by pre-tax income. PUBLIC is coded 
one if the respective firm is publicly listed. ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total 
assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of thousand total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the 
shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by either the federal republic, the states or any municipality. #SUBS is 
the number of subsidiaries of the group. IFRS is coded one if the financial statement is prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards. 
The models include fixed effects for country, time, industry (Ind.) and countries of the subsidiaries (Sub C.) when indicated. Standard errors are clustered at 
country level in the Model “All”. Otherwise the models use robust standard errors and are provided within the parentheses below the coefficients. All non-
dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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Table 9. Regressions – Conforming and non-conforming tax avoidance  
Panel A: Individual statements 
ETRTAi,t ALL BE DE ES FI FR IT NO SE 
Constant 0.019*** 0.012* 0.009*** 0.006* 0.023*** -0.006* 0.018*** 0.030*** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
PUBLICt -0.002** 0.000 -0.002** -0.007*** -0.003* 0.003* -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes No No No No No No No No 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.477 0.513 0.516 0.529 0.622 0.462 0.587 0.411 0.507 
N 42,971 977 7,611 4,641 4,934 2,719 8,840 9,329 3,920 
                   
Panel B: Group statements 
ETRTAg,t ALL BE DE ES FI FR IT NO SE 
Constant 0.016*** 0.038 0.004 -0.001 0.016*** -0.011*** 0.019*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
PUBLICt -0.002** -0.002 -0.002* -0.004* -0.006*** -0.002 -0.002* -0.004* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes No No No No No No No No 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.702 0.799 0.685 0.801 0.772 0.742 0.801 0.656 0.691 
N 39,301 904 7,079 4,221 4,497 2,406 8,110 8,365 3,719 
The table provides OLS regression results using European data from individual statements in Panel A and from group statements in Panel B. ETRTA is total tax 
expense divided by total assets. PUBLIC is coded one if the respective firm is publicly listed. Control variables and fixed effects are included in line with 
Table 7 and Table 8. The models include fixed effects for time, industry, country, and countries of the subsidiaries (Sub Country) when indicated. Standard 
errors are clustered at country level in the Model “All”. Otherwise the models use robust standard errors and are provided within the parentheses below the 
coefficients. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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Table 10. Regressions – IPOs 
 Individual Group 
ETRi/g,t (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.272*** 0.074 0.358*** 0.182 
 (0.021) (0.224) (0.016) (0.193) 
PUBLICt -0.033* -0.026 -0.048*** -0.044** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) 
ROAi/g,t   -0.288*   -0.294** 
   (0.153)   (0.117) 
DEBTi/g,t   -0.141**   -0.058 
   (0.062)   (0.079) 
PPEi/g,t   0.047   -0.007 
    (0.069)   (0.098) 
INTANGi/g,t   0.187   -0.072 
    (0.167)   (0.235) 
SIZEi/g,t   0.024   0.020 
    (0.021)   (0.017) 
IFRSg,t       -0.010 
        (0.034) 
Firm FE No Yes No Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.009 0.628 0.027 0.576 
N 520 520 520 520 
The table provides OLS regression results using European data from individual and group statements. The sample 
is limited to firms that carried out an IPO within the observation period. ETR is total tax expense divided by pre-
tax income. PUBLIC is coded one if the respective firm is publicly listed. ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt 
deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. INTANG is intangible assets 
deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of thousand total assets. FAMILY is coded one if the 
majority of the shares is owned by families. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and are provided within the 
parentheses below the coefficients. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* 
mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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Table 11. Regressions – Long-run effective tax rates  
  Individual Statements Group Statements 
Long-run ETRi,g (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.267*** 0.185*** 0.465*** 0.337*** 0.279*** 0.501*** 
 (0.049) (0.004) (0.049) (0.050) (0.015) (0.039) 
PUBLIC -0.038 -0.041*** -0.022** -0.044 -0.036*** -0.031** 
 (0.036) (0.010) (0.007) (0.036) (0.007) (0.012) 
FAMILY   0.013   0.007 
   (0.008)   (0.015) 
PUBLICt   -0.017   0.017 
*FAMILY   (0.029)   (0.029) 
mean(ROAi/g,t)   -0.412**   -0.457** 
   (0.123)   (0.175) 
mean(DEBTi/g,t)   -0.147*   -0.137** 
   (0.073)   (0.040) 
mean(PPEi/g,t)   -0.076***   0.036 
   (0.017)   (0.033) 
mean(INTANGi/g,t)   0.180*   0.236 
   (0.092)   (0.133) 
mean(SIZEi/g,t)   -0.010***   -0.013** 
   (0.002)   (0.004) 
STATE   0.058   0.029 
   (0.021)   (0.025) 
#SUBS      0.004 
      (0.003) 
IFRSg,t      -0.019 
      (0.022) 
Sub Country FE No No No No Yes Yes 
Country / Ind. FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.005 0.277 0.360 0.009 0.423 0.489 
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 
The table provides OLS regression results using data from individual statements in Model 1 to Model 3, and data 
from group statements in Model 4 to Model 6. In contrast to all other tables, firm-years with negative pre-tax 
income are not deleted. All variables are calculated as the mean of all observations per firm over the sample 
period. Firms with a negative average pre-tax income are deleted from the sample. The independent variable is 
the long-run ETR, which is the average of effective tax rates. ETR is total tax expense divided by pre-tax income. 
ROA is return on assets. DEBT is debt deflated by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by 
total assets. INTANG is intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
FAMILY is coded one if the majority of the shares is owned by families. STATE is coded one if the majority of the 
shares is owned by either the federal republic, the 16 states or any municipality. #SUBS is the number of 
subsidiaries of the group. IFRS is coded one if the financial statement is prepared in accordance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards. The models include fixed effects for industry (Ind.), country and countries of the 
subsidiaries (Sub Country) when indicated. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
***/**/* mark significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
 
